How Do We Know What We Know, and How Do We Know that We Know It?
The first step is to determine "how would we know if we knew."
The second step is to apply that principle of "how we would know" to that which is proposed to be known. Then, using that principle, we would evaluate whether the proposed knowledge was in fact knowledge. Then, voila, we would "know that we knew it," meaning that which was proposed to be known was in fact and by proof actually known.
It seems so simple.
The Skeptics have been arguing about this for centuries. From some of the Sophists of ancient Greece, in the 5th Century, B.C., to David Hume, the Scottish Philosopher of the 1700's, their consensus has been, first, that there is not a knowable self to perceive, and, second, that the sensory perceptions of the world are not trustworthy. To whom or to what the senses would be trustworthy is not determinable, because there is no recognized entity, a self, to know.
Rather than feeling downcast at having the whole world thrown into this realm of the unknowable, Skeptics are elated.
Theologians, on the other hand, relegate status of the Unknowable to God. There is a whole body of mystical writings of the Christian authors, as well as most of the other major religions, that describe or define God as the ultimately Unknowable. The more we claim to know about God, they say, the more we realize God extends beyond our grasp. Whether or not we can know the material world is generally agreed to be by virtue of Divine Grace or by virtue of Divinely bestowed reason.
Scientists, by comparison, tend to agree that (1) the wholeness of the universe, or (2) the underlying principles, such as universal laws of physics, or (3) the mathematical formulas that represent the universe, or (4) the exactitude of measurement, or any, or all, or any combination of these are not truly knowable. The predictability and measurability of the universe bogs down almost completely by the time one investigates the sub-atomic world of the fuzzy particle and wave duality. At that level, they claim, the very effort of measuring alters that which is being measured. Knowability, then, seems to depend upon the perspective of the observer. Reality shifts according to where one stands. Ultimate knowledge is unknowable until there is an ultimate measure, or an ultimate or universal perspective. Seeking a "unified theory" of the laws of physics has been an investigation of central importance to Twentieth Century.
But is a knowledge of formulas the same as knowledge of that which they are said to represent? The formulas are not the things they are said to represent. The map is not the territory.
Through all of this deliberation, by theologian or by scientist, the Skeptics are elated by the vastness of that which they do not know. Knowing more of what they do not know, the more they know they have investigated the possibilities and found them lacking.
The one principle to which they adhere is they will not accept anything as true that cannot be proven through reason. All those things that are unreasonable, or unprovable through reason, are unknowable.
They claim to know a principle, namely reason, by which they can know what they know, or what they do not know. The knowable, then, is the principle that reason is the ultimate measure.
As much as I love reason, I do have to point out that this is a contradiction. If we do know something, such as what reason is, or what a reasonable proof would be, then we are saying that we do know something, even if it is an intangible something.
Here, we are back to the inherent contradiction of the once-popular Logical Positivists. They claimed, as their principle, that which was measurable was real, and the more something was measurable, the more real it was. This is a materialist claim. Following this, they claimed that the more unmeasurable something is, the less real it is.
This logical-positivist principle was a very useful theory to sweep away a bunch of cluttering ideas from the previous centuries that had resulted in cultural confusion and, they hinted, ultimately, in the passions of the wars of Europe. Without unmeasurable theories, such as, we might guess, loyalty to king or country in the form of patriotism, or theories of forms of government or economics, there would no longer be anything, save possibly territory boundary lines, over which to fight. Ironically, in their own way, they were idealists. Doing away with the control or sway of immeasurable ideas would lead an ideal world without war or persecution. Jews could live freely, and the stability of science would abound: very good goals which were considered radical in their day.
Then, sometime in about the middle of the Twentieth Century, it was pointed out that the whole theory rested on an inherent contradiction: Logical-Positivism was based on a principle, the principle that that which was measurable was more real, and the more measurable something was, the more real it was, and the more unmeasurable something was, the more unreal it was; yet that principle was itself unmeasurable.
Using measurability as a standard meant there was a standard, but that standard could not be measured, or at least not measured by anything that was measurable. Hence, it was a contradiction, one contained within the theory itself, so it was self-contradictory, or inherently contradictory. It was a contradiction under its own terms. It failed to meet its own standard.
Logical-Positivism was upheld by many respected Philosophers and still lingers on today in some fine universities. Relegating Philosophy to the analysis of language alone has been a popular version.
I would propose, that, in a parallel manner, the Skeptics are self-defeating.
The Skeptics' claim that reason is the ultimate principle of knowability is itself a claim of knowability. They claim, first of all, that reason is real, which I am willing to grant; but they claim, additionally, that it is the only way by which we can know the world, and that if something in the world did meet the standard of proof through reason, then, that "thing" would be knowable.
If reason or proof is knowable, then there is something which is knowable, and the claim of unknowability of the world falls.
Now, some Skeptics, such as Hume, would claim that since the principle of causality can be shown to be tenuous or even wrong, then the principles of reason themselves fall aside, and there is no reason by which to know whether the world is reasonable.
Hume claimed that we could not prove that one thing caused another, but only that one thing followed the only. The actually causal link could not be established. Does one clock striking twelve cause another clock to strike twelve? Following this metaphor, he argued that all we can truly know is that one thing follows the other in time, but not that one thing reached out and caused a next thing to happen.
Therefore, some Skeptics think that even reason cannot be trusted. Since they have no remaining tool by which to know whether the sensations of the world are real and whether the world those sensations represent are real, then we can never know if anything is real. Not only is the material world untrustworthy, but so is the interior world of reason.
Ultimate Skeptics, like Christian mystics, rejoice in the trueness of Unknowability.
Ultimate Skeptics refuse to accept there is any way we can know what we know.
Rather than be gloomy, Hume, for example, said we should live by common sense.
I respond that common sense is exactly where we started in the first place, before we began this study of whether we as human being are capable of knowledge. I and others are disappointed in the resignation of many Skeptics to an unreasonable, unknowable world. What a useless effort. What a disappointment.
Why did we bother?
No wonder anti-Philosophers laugh at Philosophy as a waste of time.
At the very least, I think we can accept the principle of the Pragmatists, the first occurring school thought of US Philosophy, who claim those ideas which are the most useful are likely to be the most true. This is a very practical idea, which seems to fit a very practical nation. Despite an apparent lapse into patriotism, which taken to an extreme, "my country, right or wrong," has led to many wrong actions, despite this apparent flaw, the notion of accepting as knowable that which works has a distinct appeal to reason.
Pragmatism hosts hope for a sufficiently knowable world for humans to act and think and flourish. Thought and things are pragmatically knowable.
Later, the Phenomenologists and Existentialists of Continental Europe in the Twentieth Century accepted as given the "essence" of things in order to decide how to act, with the emphasis on action taking priority over the question of the knowledge of being. Sartre, like Socrates, placed emphasis on ethics over epistemology. Later, the Spanish Existential, Ortega, claimed we are all writing our own autobiographies. This outlook puts attention, not on whether things exist, but on individual choice and action. We act within that condition in which we find ourselves. The phenomena of being is accepted as a basis of decision and action.
Many recent Skeptics have leaned over into logic, such as Russell; and linguististics, such as Wittgenstein. Empistemology is left behind by some as ultimately unknowable, and, therefore, uninteresting.
However, just because a question is difficult does not mean, I think, that it should be ignored. Nor, just because an answer is difficult to phrase does not mean effort should not be made. The study of past attempts to describe "how we know" helps to scratch the itch of intellect and lifts our species beyond others. Even if our reach were always to exceed our grasp, the attempt is ennobling.
Again, I say, at the very least, Pragmatism hosts hope for a sufficiently knowable world for humans to act and think and flourish.
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